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ABSTRACT
The article addresses a matter that could result in profound changes
in the ability of the United States to ameliorate the most pressing
humanitarian and global problems of our times. It provides the
mechanics and addresses the solutions required to enable U.S. donors
to do more good. In an efficient market, capital ends up in its most
productive use. In charitable giving, donations are not always allocated
to their most effective use due in no small part to current cross-border
giving laws impeding that result. The article sets forth the concept of
an “efficient charitable market,” which is predicated upon unshackling
the hands of the giver. The article proposes a system for implementing
a new law that would allow U.S. donors to make contributions to nonU.S. charities.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations (UN) has stated, “Millions still live in extreme
poverty, yet the world has enough money, resources and technology to
end poverty.”1 If cross-border charitable giving could perform with the
efficiencies intrinsic to the private sector, it could have profound
impacts on the betterment of humankind. Unfortunately, the charitable
market is not remotely as efficient as the private sector for many
reasons. However, the main reason from a historic standpoint is that
U.S. laws do not favor cross-border charitable giving. This problem
was evaluated in the first article of this series, The Charitable
Deduction Games: Are the Laws in Your Favor?2 In this article, I
outline the steps needed to eventually establish what I will refer to as
an “efficient charitable market” where we are better equipped to ensure
our collective charitable investment ends up in the hands of charities
that will put it to its most productive use.3 This end goal of achieving
an efficient charitable market would allow us to address some of the
most pressing problems confronting our global society today.
A. A Short Definition of Efficient Market and an Explanation of Why
the Charitable Market Falls Short
In an efficient market, private sector investors rarely receive returns
that exceed average market returns given the amount of information—
and fluidity of funds—available at the time of the investment.4 In the
inefficient charitable market, beating the market is easy: All the private
investor (i.e., donor) must do is give to a charity that a reputable rating
organization like GiveWell recommends.5 These charities will
1. Get Involved, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/getinvolved.shtml (last
visited Sept. 23, 2014).
2. See generally Khrista Johnson, The Charitable Deductions Game: Are the Laws in Your Favor?,
5 COLUM. J. TAX L. 69 (2013).
3. Id.; see also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN., no. 2, May 1970, at 383–417, for an explanation of the efficient markets theory.
4. Fama, supra note 3, at 383.
5. Luke Muehlhauser, How Efficient is the Charitable Market?, EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM FORUM (Aug.
26, 2013), http://www.effective-altruism.com/how-efficient-charitable-market/; see also Farhad Manjoo,
How to Know if Your Gift to Charity Will Count, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2013, at B8.
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“achieve far greater returns (in social value) per marginal dollar than
the average charity [will].”6 In other words, the private investors will
receive a dramatically better return on their investment, seeing a
measurable impact, from investing in one of these charities as opposed
to other nonrecommended charities. This restriction of information,
together with cross-border giving laws that make it difficult to give to
non-U.S. charities, highlight inefficiencies of the charitable market
partially because they show investments often do not end up with the
charities that will put them to most productive use.7
B. Expectations of Philanthropists Today
At one end of the spectrum, some ponder that we should expect
charitable markets to be as efficient as the private sector. Eric
Thurman, Chief Executive Officer of Geneva Global, which provides
research and grant management for philanthropists internationally, has
succinctly underscored this point: “Approaching philanthropy as a
form of investment is an important part of the solution to the problems
of philanthropy.”8 On an optimistic note, he has found that now more
than ever “donors are treating their giving like their investments.”9
Furthermore, Geneva Global has found that the “highest returns on
investment” result from “local, grassroots organizations rather than big
national agencies or international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).”10
At the other end of the spectrum is the status quo, where there is
often little to no concern about the performance of charities.11 Private
investors frequently contribute to charities without expecting a return
(in social value) for their investment.12 Similarly, charities are
unaccustomed to accounting for the productive use of funds invested
6. Muehlhauser, supra note 5.
7. See generally Johnson, supra note 2.
8. Eric Thurman, Performance Philanthropy: Bringing Accountability to Charitable Giving, HARV.
INT’L REV., Spring 2006, at 18, 19.
9. Id. at 18.
10. Id.
11. KEN STERN, WITH CHARITY FOR ALL: WHY CHARITIES ARE FAILING AND A BETTER WAY TO GIVE
16 (2013).
12. See id. at 15–16.
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in them.13 Even after being asked to produce reports of effectiveness,
charities are unable to do so.14 The current market is pushing charities
away from being the effective providers they need to be for investors
and for the causes they set out to address: “[M]arket incentives of the
nonprofit world push charities toward happy anecdote and inspiring
narrative rather than toward careful planning, research, and evidencebased investments . . . .”15
C. Why? . . . Because the Laws Are Currently Not in Your Favor
To achieve an efficient charitable market, we must first confront the
problem in our laws. In charitable giving, investment is not always
allocated to its most effective use because cross-border giving laws
impede that result. As explained in the first article in this series, the
U.S. must change its cross-border giving law to make investing in, or
giving to non-U.S. charities a sensible option.16 The European Union
(EU) recently made an equivalent change in 2009 to make cross-border
giving easier, which shows alternatives are available. Simply stated,
our current cross-border giving laws make it too difficult, and much
less effective, for a U.S. private investor to invest in non-U.S.
charities.17 Now that the problem has been identified, this article turns
to a viable solution with the end goal of an efficient charitable market
in mind.
D. Catching Change: Identifying Barriers & Bridges to an Efficient
Charitable Market
In this article, I identify attendant barriers and bridges to
establishing an efficient charitable market. Each part of this article
provides a solution for impediments associated with unshackling the
13. Id. at 16.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Johnson, supra note 2, at 98–99.
17. See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Domestic Activities, Foreign
Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361, 392 (2012) (arguing that placing U.S. and foreign
charities on par with each other would foster having tax subsidies go to the charities that are “the most
efficient providers of charitable services”).
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hands of U.S. givers. Part I outlines how the U.S. should determine the
global goals (i.e., charitable purposes) of non-U.S. charities that are
allowed U.S. investment (i.e., deductible donations). Part II explains
the mechanics of a standardized charitable form for non-U.S. charities
eligible to receive such investment. Part III provides a path for insuring
that these investments do not land in terrorist hands. Finally, this article
sets forth a solution for the three main problems associated with
changing U.S. cross-border giving laws to create an environment
conducive to an efficient charitable market.
I. CHARITABLE PURPOSES OF NON-U.S. CHARITIES
For an efficient charitable market to exist, the U.S. must change its
cross-border giving law to allow donations to non-U.S. charities to
result in a deduction for U.S. donors.18 This has already been
recognized in the EU, and EU law was changed in a 2009 landmark
European Court of Justice (ECJ) case, Persche v. Finanzamt
Lüdenscheid.19 In changing U.S. cross-border giving law, one must
confront the problem of determining which non-U.S. charities should
be eligible to receive U.S. deductible donations (eligible non-U.S.
charities). Opening the floodgates too widely to non-U.S. charities
would be a mistake. The U.S. must narrow the field of eligible nonU.S. charities to which U.S. investment may be directed. Specifically,
one must determine which charitable purposes permit non-U.S.
charities to qualify as eligible non-U.S. charities. Currently, U.S.
charities must limit their charitable purposes to those listed in Internal
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) (Code Section 501(c)(3)).20 I propose
that we identify which charitable purposes reflect internationally
18. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 72–73 (explaining that U.S. donors to foreign charitable
organizations do not receive deductions for charitable contributions to non-U.S. charities under current
cross-border giving law and discussing the limited alternatives available for such U.S. donors).
19. See Case C-318/07, Persche v. Finanzamt Lüdenscheid, 2009 E.C.R. I-359 (directing EU Member
States to revise their laws to permit deductions for cross-border giving in the EU); see also Sigrid J.C.
Hemels & Stan A. Stevens, The European Foundation Proposal: A Shift in the EU Tax Treatment of
Charities?, 21 EC TAX REV. 293 (2012) (stating that the European Union (EU) is continuing to progress
toward enabling “efficient[] channeling [of] private funds to [charitable purposes] on a cross-border basis
in the European Union.”).
20. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 75 (discussing available charitable purposes).
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agreed upon, pressing global problems. In this section, I will explore
how the U.S. may determine what those global problems are, and I
conclude that the U.S. should restrict the charitable purposes of
eligible non-U.S. charities to those problems.
A. Defining “Good” Globally
The U.S. should determine the charitable purposes that qualify
based upon whether they achieve a purpose that is recognized globally
as an urgent “common unit of good.”21 As one commentator has noted,
the charitable market is not as efficient as financial markets because
there is not agreement on what a “common unit of good” means across
the world.22 In the private sector, the “common unit of good,” whether
the investor is in the U.S. or in Italy, is an increased return, or money.23
All financial investors agree upon this matter.24 There has already been
agreement across the board on what the main problems of our global
society are today, and priority should be given to addressing those first.
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that an attempt at establishing an
efficient charitable market could be accomplished across all sectors in
its beginning stages. I argue that the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (UN MDGs)25 constitute such common units of
good and provide a framework for determining the answer.
The UN MDGs serve as an international standard of common units
of good the U.S. and other nations are seeking to accomplish, and thus,
they should form the initial body of charitable purposes for eligible
non-U.S. charities. The UN MDGs are informative in terms of
21. See Muehlhauser, supra note 5.
22. Brian Tomasik, Comment to Broad Market Efficiency, THE GIVEWELL BLOG (May 4, 2013, 9:32
PM), http://blog.givewell.org/2013/05/02/broad-market-efficiency/comment-page-1/#comment-542070
(“Efficiency in the realm of charity is inherently less plausible than in financial markets because in charity
there [is] not a common unit of what ‘good’ means . . . .”).
23. See MILLENNIUMPROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 46–47 (2005), available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/
documents/MainReportComplete-lowres.pdf.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 15, 82–83 (stating the following goals: (1) “[e]radicate extreme poverty and hunger;”
(2) “[a]chieve universal primary education;” (3) “[p]romote gender equality and empower women;” (4)
“[r]educe child mortality;” (5) “[i]mprove maternal health,” (6) “[c]ombat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other
diseases;” (7) “[e]nsure environmental stability;” and (8) “[d]evelop a global partnership for
development”).
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considering what the desired common units of good across the global
landscape are. These eight goals represent “a blueprint agreed to by all
the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development
institutions” to confront the most pressing issues of our time, including
the poverty, hunger, and disease plaguing billions of people as well as
climate change.26 The target date for achieving these goals is 2015, and
thus far, progress has been inadequate.27
B. Adequate Funding Resources and Inadequate Progress
Another reason for using the UN MDGs to define the charitable
purposes of eligible non-U.S. charities is the funding crisis preventing
the attainment of these goals. In 2002, the UN Secretary-General
commissioned the Millennium Project, whose purpose was to form an
action plan for achieving the UN MDGs.28 In 2005, an independent
advisory body, which renowned economist Professor Jeffrey Sachs
led, compiled its final recommendations into a report.29 In analyzing
impediments to private investment in achieving the UN MDGs,
Professor Sachs stated that private investors need to know that they
“can earn at least the minimum return they need to invest.”30 Most
relevantly, he declared that a “key variable[] of interest” to such
investors is “[f]avorable tax treatment.”31 In other words, the U.S.
needs to change its U.S. cross-border giving laws with respect to the
UN MDGs.
Revising our cross-border giving laws with respect to the UN MDGs
would allow for an efficient charitable market with respect to pressing
common units of good. As the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) stated in a 2004 policy brief, it is
26. Background: U.N. Millennium Development Goals, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
bkgd.shtml.
27. U.N. Secretary-General, Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals:
Options for Sustained and Inclusive Growth and Issues for Advancing the United Nations Development
Agenda Beyond 2015, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/67/257 (Aug. 6, 2012).
28. See generally MILLENNIUMPROJECT, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/ (last visited Oct. 9,
2014).
29. MILLENNIUMPROJECT, supra note 23.
30. Id. at 46.
31. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/2

8

: The Charitable Deduction Games: Catching Change

2015]

THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION GAMES

297

clear that charitable giving plays an important role in funding the UN
MDGs, and donations from “both small-scale donors and the superrich” are integral.32 A 2003 OECD study revealed that private
foundations have contributed significantly in several areas, including,
inter alia, agriculture (the “Green Revolution”) and preventing
infectious diseases.33 The U.S. leads the OECD countries in terms of
giving, where private donations have generally measured in at 2% of
Gross National Product (GNP).34 In 2002, GNP in the U.S. was
approximately $11 trillion, which means private donations totaled
$220 billion.35 The UN has recently projected that $30 billion is
necessary to end the current food crisis.36 However, the numbers have
not been reflected in the charities’ expenditure numbers. The OECD
has estimated that the annual expenditures for philanthropic
organizations total the much smaller sum of $3 billion.37
An important and pressing question is: Why are charitable
investments not being used to fund UN MDGs effectively?38
Implementation of a new cross-border giving law should promote
giving to non-U.S. charities pursuing UN MDGs.39 This would
promote an efficient charitable market with respect to the UN MDGs.
Ultimately, U.S. funding is not being directed toward common units
of good or resulting in the social value that we and the rest of the world
have deemed important.40 This is in direct contrast to capital markets
efficiency where “investment capital is allocated to its most [effective]
use.”41 By narrowing the areas of charitable work that qualify for a
deduction (i.e., restricting charitable purposes) to those that constitute
32. HELMUT REISEN, INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO FUNDING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOALS 15–16 (2004) [hereinafter OECD POLICY BRIEF], available at http://www.oecd.org/development
/pgd/31430478.pdf.
33. Philanthropic Foundations and Development Co-operation, 4 DAC J. 73, 89–97 (2003).
34. See OECD POLICY BRIEF, supra note 32, at 16.
35. Id.
36. Andrew Martin & Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Says Food Plan Could Cost $30 Billion a Year, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2008, at A6.
37. OECD POLICY BRIEF, supra note 32, at 16.
38. See id.
39. See MILLENNIUM PROJECT, supra note 23, at 176–77.
40. See Muehlhauser, supra note 5.
41. Chicago Ideas: Efficient Markets Theory, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS.,
http://www.chicagobooth.edu/ideas/efficientmarket.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
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“common units of good,” the U.S. may make progress in establishing
an efficient charitable market in the charitable sector where it is needed
most urgently. This would also mean giving up less control over
monitoring since there would be fewer non-U.S. charities to consider,
i.e., only those addressing the UN MDGs. I would urge the U.S. to
consider changing its cross-border giving laws to promote greater ease
in giving to non-U.S. charities with a charitable purpose reflective of
the UN MDGs.
II. AN EFFICIENT CHARITABLE FORM FOR NON-US CHARITIES
In changing its cross-border giving law, the U.S. also must outline
a standard charitable form, reflective of minimum requirements, for
eligible non-U.S. charities. The U.S. may be assured that non-U.S.
charities complying with the form largely are equivalent to U.S.
charities. The need for a standard charitable form is evidenced in the
EU’s experience.42 Even after EU law was changed in 2009, many
obstacles to cross-border giving remain.43 Due to the variation in civil
and tax laws across the Member States, cross-border giving has been
made expensive and administratively difficult.44 EU charities have
continued to incur unreasonable costs and inefficiencies as a result of
having to seek out legal advice to comply with administrative
requirements.45 As the European Commission found, this causes
charities to use valuable resources to meet legal and administrative
objectives, rather than to achieve their stated charitable purposes and
may also serve as a disincentive to expanding charitable work.46 In
other words, these costs and burdens are impediments to an efficient
charitable market. These same costs and burdens will exist in terms of
the U.S. cross-border context even after the U.S. revises its relevant
laws. This section provides a solution. I will consider the standard
42. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 293.
43. Id. at 293–94.
44. Id. at 293.
45. Press Release, European Comm’n, Proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for a European Found.
(FE)—Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 8, 2012) [hereinafter FE Press Release], available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-79_en.htm?locale=fr.
46. Id.
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charitable form that has been proposed in the EU as a viable solution
and how the U.S. may adapt this form so eligible non-U.S. charities
can have certainty in knowing they will receive a stamp of approval
from the U.S., i.e., donations to them will result in a U.S. deduction.
A. Using the Newly Proposed European Foundation Statute to
Produce a Solution
Three years after the change in EU cross-border giving law marked
the beginning of a solution to these problems. In February 2012, the
European Commission set forth a proposal (the Proposal) for a
European Foundation Statute (FE Statute) that details a standardized
charitable form, i.e., the European Foundation or Fundatio Europaea
(FE).47 In sum, the FE is a legal form detailing minimum requirements
for charities that would be recognized by all EU Member States as able
to receive deductible donations.
The purpose of the FE Statute is to facilitate what Persche has
mandated as law: the ability to engage in cross-border giving across
the EU with greater ease.48 The Proposal sets forth three distinct
advantages associated with the FE Statute.49 First, it would cut down
on costs and uncertainty associated with procuring funds from nondomestic countries.50 Secondly, it would offer FEs a European stamp
of approval that would lead to greater legitimacy in the cross-border
context.51 Third, the tax treatment of an FE would be obvious and
compelling.52 Enactment of the statute would place FEs on the same
footing as domestic charities, enabling them to take in donations from
donors from any participating EU Member State.53

47. See id.; Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation
(FE), COM (2012) 35 final (Aug. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
48. See FE Press Release, supra note 45, at 2 (“Donors should find donating to foreign foundations
less costly and simpler. Moreover, the uniform rules and European label connected to the [FE] Statute
should make European Foundations more trustworthy and recognisable for donors.”).
49. See generally id.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 3.
52. See id. at 6.
53. Id.
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B. Basic Characterizations of a Standardized Charitable Form
(European Foundation Statute with U.S. Modifications)
The following is an examination of the basic characteristics of the
FE form and an analysis of which provisions should be modified from
a U.S. standpoint. The definition of an FE is very similar to a private
foundation or public charity in the U.S.54 As is the case with private
foundations and public charities in the U.S., FEs may be “grantmaking foundations” and thus fund the charitable activities of others
in the way U.S. “friends of” organizations do,55 or they may carry out
charitable activities themselves in a manner similar to U.S. public
charities.56 Like private foundations and public charities in the U.S.,
private individuals, corporations, or governments may establish FEs.57
Generally, an FE is a nonmembership organization with a publicbenefit purpose and, in terms of entity characteristics, is private, selfgoverning, and non-profit-distributing.58 Commentators have noted
that it appears to be modeled on the concept of a French foundation
given the requirement that it has a public-benefit object.59 Notably, it
differs from a Dutch foundation, which is not required to have a publicbenefit purpose.60 The definition also excludes a United Kingdom
(U.K.) company limited by shares that is registered as a charity
because such entity would have share capital.61 In contrast, a U.K.
company limited by guarantee, registered as a charity would satisfy the
definition.62 Another term for an FE is a non-profit organization;63
however, given the restrictions listed above, the term foundation is
more accurate.
54. Compare Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 6, with Johnson, supra note 2, at 81.
55. Compare Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 17, and Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at
293–294, with Johnson, supra note 2, at 81.
56. Compare Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 15–17, and Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19,
at 294, with Johnson, supra note 2, at 81.
57. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 294; I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Johnson, supra note 2, at
81.
58. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 293.
59. Id.
60. Johnson, supra note 2, at 95; Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 293.
61. Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 293.
62. See id.
63. See FE Press Release, supra note 45, at 4.
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An examination of the legal components of the FE is helpful in
terms of understanding its shortcomings and whether such a form
would satisfy U.S. standards of what constitutes a charity (to which
deductible charitable contributions may be made). First, FEs, like U.S.
charities (i.e., private foundations and public charities), must be
formed for a purpose deemed charitable under a statute.64 Similar to
the U.S. statute that defines these purposes for a U.S. charity, Code
Section 501(c)(3), the Proposal contains a list of allowable charitable
purposes for an FE.65
Several of the charitable purposes, or public-benefit purposes, of the
Proposal are ones that would lend themselves to support from around
the world or may qualify as common units of good, as explored in Part
I: specifically, (e) social welfare, including prevention or relief of
poverty; (f) humanitarian or disaster relief; (m) education and training;
and (o) health, well-being, and medical care.66 As explained in Part I,
the U.S. should allow, at least initially, a revision of the law in regard
to internationally accepted common units of good. The EU also has
underscored this point in detailing the charitable purposes for which
an FE may be organized.67 In discussing why cross-border giving
within the EU should be easier, Internal Market Commissioner Michel
Barnier isolated a few charitable purposes that he saw as more global
in nature: “‘We need to support and encourage the valuable work that
foundations do for European citizens. In particular, we need to remove
the obstacles which hinder their cross-border work on issues such as
research, health or culture.’”68
Eventually, the U.S. would need to consider which charitable
purposes—in addition to those outlined in the UN MDGs—currently
detailed in Code Section 501(c)(3) would fall under this category of
global causes. It would seem obvious that research on preventive

64. Id.; see Johnson, supra note 2, at 75 (discussing the requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
65. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 15–16.
66. Id. at 15.
67. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 298–99.
68. Press Release, European Commission, Promoting Projects That Benefit Society at Large: The
European Foundation Statute, (Feb. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Promoting Projects], available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-112_en.htm?locale=fr.
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treatment or medicine would qualify.69 However, it may be more
difficult to reach a consensus on the extension of culture.70 Oddly and
incorrectly, the list of public-benefit purposes does not include
religion, although religion is deemed a public benefit in all EU
Member States.71 The first charitable purpose listed in Code Section
501(c)(3) is a religious one.72 It is imperative to think through which
charitable purposes would be included from a U.S. perspective.73 The
European Commission’s failure to provide an interpretation of these
categories is a shortcoming.74 The absence of a definition leaves too
much uncertainty for “charities and their donors and for tax authorities
and supervisory authorities.”75
Second, the FE must have a cross-border aspect that involves at least
two Member States in the carrying out of its purpose.76 If this
requirement applied to the U.S. system, the U.S. would narrow the
extension of tax deductibility to those non-U.S. charities working on
charitable purposes carried out in an international context, e.g., the UN
MDGs. This idea has been explored in Part I. Thus, at least initially,
the U.S. should consider an even more stringent requirement than the
FE Statute provides.
Third, the Proposal details rules that prohibit for-profit activity,77
akin to U.S. unrelated business income tax (UBIT) rules and a
minimum capitalization requirement.78 The third requirement subjects
FEs to a set of rules similar to the UBIT rules that restrict U.S. charities
from engaging in for-profit activities unrelated to their charitable

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
See Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 15–16.
Id.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
See Johnson, supra note 2, at 74–75.
See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 299.
Id.
Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 6, 16.
Id. at 17.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 598: TAX ON UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME OF
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf (explaining a
charity “is not taxed on its income from an activity substantially related to the charitable, educational, or
other purpose that is the basis for the organization’s exemption” but it is “subject to tax on its income
from [an] unrelated . . . business.”).
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purpose.79 Here, the U.S. naturally would want to extend its UBIT
requirements to non-U.S. charities to avoid potential economic abuse.
In terms of capitalization, the Proposal provides that an FE must have
a minimum amount of assets, specifically 25,000 euro.80 The U.S.
should consider requiring eligible non-U.S. charities to have a
minimum amount of assets, perhaps exceeding the FE amount.
Fourth, FEs are governed by their statutes, i.e., bylaws, and are
subject to national charity law only in regard to matters the Proposal
or their bylaws have “not regulated or only partly regulated.”81 Thus,
national charity law may not limit the activity of an FE beyond what
is described in the Proposal. However, the governing board of the FE
is subject not only to the FE’s bylaws but also to national law regarding
charitable governance.82 Clearly, the U.S. would want to ensure nonU.S. charities detailed the requirements of charitable governance in
their bylaws. Perhaps having such non-U.S. charities comply with their
own nation’s charity law would be sufficient. This would require the
U.S. to review and approve each nation’s charitable laws, particularly
anti-terrorist measures, or to rely upon the findings of an international
supervisory body, which is discussed in Part III.83 In terms of a nation
like the U.K., that requirement would be easily satisfied. At the same
time, the U.S. would likely want features of its own U.S. charitable
law to serve as an additional layer of regulation in terms of such
governance.84
The Proposal details three ways to form an FE. Most relevant for
comparison purposes are the following: (1) “by the merger of public
benefit purpose entities legally established in one or more Member
States” or (2) “by the conversion of a national public benefit purpose
entity legally established in a Member State into the FE.”85 The
79. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 17; PUBLICATION 598, supra note 78, at 3–7; see also
Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 298.
80. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 16.
81. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 299.
82. See generally, Commission Proposal, supra note 47; see also FE Press Release, supra note 45.
83. See discussion infra Part III.B.
84. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(m)(1) (2012) (explaining a charitable organization will be denied tax
exemption if a substantial part of its activities consists of providing commercial-type insurance).
85. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 6. The third method is via “a testamentary disposition, by
notarial deed or by a written declaration.” Id.
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Proposal also provides requirements for the bylaws, such as the
minimum content they must contain.86 The bylaws must be in writing,
and there are restrictions on amending them, e.g., only if the purpose
for which the FE was established has been achieved or cannot be
achieved or if the current purpose is not “a suitable and effective
method of using the FE’s assets.”87 Amendment of the bylaws will be
an area that the U.S. should scrutinize carefully in light of its
dissolution and private inurement rules.88 The method of altering the
charitable purpose of the FE seems too relaxed to satisfy U.S.
charitable standards.89 Under the Proposal, amendment simply
requires consistency with the “will of the founder.”90
A pressing issue for the U.S. in revising its cross-border giving laws
is the presence of oversight by other national regulatory authorities.91
Specifically, concern about funds being used to support terrorist
activity is one that cannot be ignored or simplified. This concern is
addressed in Part III. The idea that a Member State could not provide
effective fiscal supervision was rejected in a case that preceded
Persche, Centro di Musicologica Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt
München für Körperschaften.92 In Stauffer, the ECJ instead noted that
a Member State could implement measures to check whether a nonresident charity was complying with conditions for charitable status
under its national law, and to monitor how well it was being
managed.93 A Member State could also require submissions of
evidence.94

86. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 21–22. The anti-terrorist provisions that should be
reflected in the bylaws are explored in Part III.
87. Id. at 22.
88. See Life Cycle of a Public Charity – Jeopardizing Exemption, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Life-Cycle-of-a-Public-Charity-Jeopardizing-Exemption (last
updated Mar. 6, 2014) (explaining if a charitable organization is found to operate for the benefit of private
interests of its founder or shareholders, then it risks losing its tax exempt status).
89. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at § 2, art. 20.
90. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 299.
91. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 83–84.
92. Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für Körperschaften,
2006 E.C.R. I-8204–05.
93. Id. at I-8204.
94. See id.
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Under the Proposal, oversight of the FEs is carried out through a
registration requirement.95 FEs must be registered in a Member State,
and each Member State must establish a registry that compiles
information about them.96 FEs not only must register, but also must
notify the European Commission of such action.97 In addition, the
respective registries are subject to an information exchange regarding
FEs, which means they must communicate with each other.98 In terms
of requirements, the registry does not have to be an independent
organization.99 Although an existing organization, such as the
Chamber of Commerce, may serve as the registry, a definitive answer
has not been provided regarding whether existing tax authorities may
fulfill this role.100 This requirement may be even more stringent than
the current system in the U.S. since charities are required to register
only with an existing tax authority, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).101
In summary, to avoid continued obstacles to cross-border giving in
spite of a change in the law, the U.S. should provide eligible non-U.S.
charities with a standardized charitable form. This would provide
eligible non-U.S. charities with assurance that the U.S. considers them
to have met minimum requirements. The EU only realized the need for
a standardized charitable form after changing its cross-border giving
law. The EU’s Proposal for an FE Statute may serve as guidance for a
U.S. standardized charitable form, and it may be adapted to U.S.
concerns.

95. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 23–26.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 22–25.
99. Id.
100. Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 300.
101. Application for Recognition of Exemption, IRS (last updated July 1, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Application-for-Recognition-of-Exemption;
see
also
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 557: TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 30
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf.
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III. KEEPING CHARITABLE FUNDS OUT OF THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS
In this section, I will confront the Achilles’ heel of an argument to
change U.S. cross-border giving laws, and show that there is a solution
to ensure unshackled funds are not more likely to end up as terrorist
financing. An argument has been consistently put forward that we must
continue to restrict U.S. investment to charities formed in the U.S.
because we need the IRS’s oversight to ensure funds do not wind up
in the hands of terrorists.102 That argument is misguided for several
reasons. First, make no mistake about the present reality: funds
donated to U.S. charities have ended up and continue to end up as
terrorist financing.103 The devastating attack on September 11, 2001
led to the adoption of three mechanisms to ensure charitable funds are
not used to promote terrorist activities: (1) Executive Order 13224, (2)
the USA Patriot Act;104 and (3) the 2002 Treasury Department AntiTerrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for USBased Charities (Guidelines).105 The Guidelines were designed to
provide assistance with complying with the two former measures.106
They were revised and re-published in 2006 (the Revised Guidelines),
and the net result of the revision still has not led to greater effectiveness
of the IRS in stopping the diversion of charitable funds to terrorist
financing.107 In fact, it is questionable whether the IRS is more
effective than other foreign governmental agencies in preventing the
diversion of funds to terrorist activities.108 Second, there are
102. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 83–84.
103. See Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal
Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their Donors,
23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 115 (2003).
104. Janne G. Gallagher, Grantmaking in an Age of Terrorism: Some Thoughts About Compliance
Strategies, INT’L DATELINE (Council on Founds., Washington, D.C.), Second Quarter 2004, at 1; see also
Johnson, supra note 2, at 83 (stating the former, among other restrictions, makes it illegal for any U.S.
person to engage in a transaction with individuals and organizations named on any terrorism watch lists
of the U.S. government and the latter increased the purview of criminal prohibitions related to supporting
terrorist activities and strengthened the penalties for noncompliance).
105. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities, 71 Fed.
Reg. 63,838, 63,843 (Oct. 31, 2006).
106. See id. at 63,846.
107. See Crimm, supra note 103, at 113–115 (describing how U.S. charities have been used to finance
terrorist activity).
108. See id. at 118.
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international supervisory agencies that have surveyed and continue to
monitor the effectiveness of countries, including the U.S., in terms of
their ability to prevent charitable funding from becoming terrorist
financing,109 and the U.S. can rely on their methodologies and findings
in deciding which countries’ charitable laws it views and practices it
views as acceptable. I will examine the extent of diversion of
charitable funds to terrorist financing in the U.S.; the work of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in monitoring this issue
internationally;110 and how the Revised Guidelines may be used in
tandem with FATF efforts to allay fears about contributions going
abroad to ultimately create an efficient charitable market.111 In sum, I
will confront the concerns of implementation from an anti-terrorism
perspective and ultimately conclude that those concerns may be abated
with careful consideration and application of the Revised Guidelines
to the FATF’s current monitoring program.
A. Current IRS Monitoring of Charitable Funds
In arguing that we should restrict tax deductible donations to U.S.
charities, observers have frequently reasoned that doing otherwise
would allow charitable funds to escape the careful purview of IRS
oversight and end up in the hands of terrorists.112 However, this is a
fallacy because the IRS is not currently doing a sufficient job of
monitoring U.S. charities, and it is not even entirely to blame. The
number of charitable organizations in comparison to IRS examiners
has increased dramatically since the 1990s.113 Relevantly, the
109. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATTING MONEY
LAUNDERING & THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION, THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 8
(2012) [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf.
110. About the FATF: Who We Are, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last visited Oct.
14, 2014).
111. Id.
112. David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 545, 596 (2006);
see Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 TAX LAW. 655, 663 (1995).
113. Written Statement of Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Before the Committee
on Finance, United States Senate: Hearing on Exempt Organizations: Enforcement Problems,
Accomplishments, and Future Direction, Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/metest040505.pdf [hereinafter Everson Statement].
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International Committee on Fundraising Organizations (ICFO)
published a comparative survey in 2002 of its members, which
includes the U.S. In its report, it noted the following in regard to the
oversight in the U.S.:
[B]ecause of the high volume [of reports] only those organizations
which are exposed by media investigations or are otherwise the
subject of numerous complaints, get investigated. The same
limited resource is true of State monitoring agencies. The result is
a lightly regulated industry brought about in part because of the
lack of resources to monitor so many organizations, plus the very
real constitutional protections that are afforded U.S. charities. The
issues of free speech and separation of Church and State allow
[charities] considerable latitude in functioning without close
oversight. 114

The section of the IRS responsible for such monitoring, the Tax
Exempt and Government Entities Division (TE/GE), is simply
overwhelmed with charities.115 Between 1995 and 2003, as the number
of exempt organization returns grew, the number of enforcement
personnel conducting oversight decreased in inverse correlation.116
In 2005, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson
stated, “In the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division
(TE/GE), as in the rest of the IRS, our enforcement presence faded in
the late 1990’s. . . . [W]e were, and continue to be, struggling with
yearly increases in the number of applications for tax exemption.”117
He also elaborated upon the resulting consequences: “This decline in
enforcement presence, combined with the significant growth of the
tax-exempt sector . . . created opportunities for noncompliance. We
simply did not do enough ‘policing’ in the area to support the good
114. INGRID-HÉLÈNE GUET, MONITORING FUNDRAISING: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ICFO
MEMBERS AND THEIR COUNTRIES 33 (2002), available at http://www.icfo.org/Uploaded_files/
Zelf/survey-formatted.pdf.
115. See Everson Statement, supra note 113, at 3.
116. See id. at 2–3.
117. Id. at 3.
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actors in their quest to voluntarily comply with the rules.”118 One
scholar found in 2003 that U.S. taxpayers provided 30% of the support
terrorist organizations raised in the U.S. through abuse of charities.119
Alarmingly, in 2007, six years after 9/11, neither the Treasury
Department,120 the Senate Finance Committee,121 nor the IRS were
pleased with the current precautions in place.122 Two years after Mark
Everson’s stirring words, the IRS was still using paper documents and
the same inadequate watch lists to locate potential terrorist connections
as indicated in a 2007 Audit (Inspector General Audit) by the Treasury
Department’s Inspector General for Tax Administration (Inspector
General).123 The Inspector General urged the IRS to use a more
“comprehensive terrorist watch list” to ferret out terrorist ties.124 The
Inspector General did not mince words when analyzing the
shortcomings of the IRS in terms of oversight of charities:
[T]he Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is lax in its screening of
charities for possible terrorist activities. In a recent report (200710-082) the [I]nspector [G]eneral charged that the IRS exempt
organization office falls short in its efforts to identify and pursue
cases involving tax-exempt organizations and related individuals
potentially involved in terrorist-related activities. The report
emphasizes that this is a significant problem because charities and

118. Id.
119. Mindy Herzfeld, Restricting the Flow of Funds from U.S. Charities to International Terrorist
Organizations—A Proposal, 56 TAX LAW. 875, 882 (2003) (approximating a 30% tax rate).
120. See generally, TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., No. 2007-10-082, SCREENING
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS’ FILING INFORMATION PROVIDES MINIMAL ASSURANCE THAT POTENTIAL
TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES ARE IDENTIFIED (2007) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT]
(noting the deficiencies in the IRS review process for tax-exempt organizations and proposing measures
to systematically compare forms against terrorist watch lists).
121. Press Release, The U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Baucus Wants Stronger Scrutiny of Tax-Exempt
Groups
for
Terror
Ties
(May
25,
2007)
[hereinafter
Baucus],
available
at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=be60a055-866f-4b60-b6ec149865ae03fa.
122. Steven Toscher & Chad Nardiello, IRS Scrutiny of Tax-Exempt Organizations, L.A. LAW., October
2005, at 18–20.
123. INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT, supra note 120, at 3.
124. Id. at 3–8 (indicating that this creates a risk that charities financing terrorism will not be reported
to the federal government authorities fighting terrorism and explaining the need for use of a more inclusive
terrorist watch list).
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nonprofit organization[s] have been an important source of
alleged terrorist support.125

Simply stated, the IRS was deemed to have taken inadequate steps
to prevent terrorist financing. The Inspector General Audit concluded
that “[t]he use of charities and nonprofit organizations” still provides
a “significant source of alleged terrorist support.”126 Indeed, the IRS
itself reflected that the rules it had established were “not well-suited to
prevent funds from being used to support terrorist activities.”127 The
IRS terrorist financing prevention process works by comparing
information on exemption applications (i.e., Form 1023) and
information returns to the terrorist watch list of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC).128 This process has been criticized as
“inadequate to meaningfully identify terrorist-related activities by
charitable organizations.”129 Members of Congress have also observed
and attested to the inadequacy of the measures the IRS utilizes in terms
of oversight. Indeed, Max Baucus, when Chair of the Senate Finance
Committee, stressed the need for Treasury to “step up efforts to
identify tax-exempt charities and nonprofit organizations with possible
links to terrorist activities.”130
B. International Supervisory Organizations
If one examines the effectiveness of international supervisory
organizations, one may conclude that at least one of these
organizations is performing at the highest level. In this section, I will
consider the international landscape of global monitoring in general
and the oversight of the FATF in particular. Such an examination
shows that the U.S. may rely on the FATF’s regular assessments of
125. Alan Rice, IRS Screening of Charities is Lax, 06-07 Pratt’s Anti-Money Laundering Update 5 (June
2007) (referring to the warning in the Inspector General’s report).
126. INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT, supra note 120, at 1.
127. Toscher & Nardiello, supra note 122, at 20.
128. INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT, supra note 120, at 4–5.
129. Douglas N. Varley, Trends and Developments in Cross-Border Philanthropy: International
Grantmaking, Social Enterprise, and Stepped-Up Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND ESTATE
PLANNING 433, 459 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 2009).
130. Baucus, supra note 121.
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countries’ anti-terrorist financing measures, and thus, the U.S. may
defer safely to countries that have received a satisfactory FATF rating.
The FATF’s standards exceed that of the U.S.131 In fact, two of the
countries the U.S. currently has reciprocity with in terms of charitable
giving have failed to meet the standards of the FATF and have received
an FATF rating lower than that of the U.S.132 This finding strengthens
the argument for the U.S. to rely on FATF ratings in determining
which countries’ charities would be eligible to receive U.S. tax
deductible donations. Moreover, as the FATF assessments show, there
are already more extensive measures in place in other countries,133 and
the U.S. should have no problem with turning over some of its
monitoring responsibilities to those FATF-approved countries in the
name of producing a more efficient charitable market.
1. International Landscape of Supervisory Organizations
The international landscape is full of mechanisms designed to
ensure that charitable funds do not end up in the hands of terrorists.
The works of several international bodies have confronted this issue.
First, the UN adopted an International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism that was signed by 185 parties, including
the U.S.134 Second, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) has emphasized the need for an international legal
framework designed to combat terrorism, and it holds workshops
designed to meet this goal.135 Within the OSCE is the Action Against
Terrorism Unit,136 which has adopted ministerial statements pertaining
to decreasing terrorism.137

131. See infra Part III.D.
132. See infra Part III.E.
133. See infra Part III.E.
134. G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Feb. 25, 2000).
135. See Consolidated Reference for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts (last updated March 2014),
available at http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99765?download=true; see also OSCE Holds Meeting to
Discuss Preventing Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations for Terrorist Financing, ORGANIZATION FOR
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.osce.org/atu/51301.
136. See Consolidated Reference for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, at 15–18 (last updated March
2014), available at http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99765?download=true.
137. Id. at 11–12.
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Another relevant presence in the international landscape pertaining
to the prevention of terrorist financing through charities138 is the
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC). The CGCC
is a “nonprofit, nonpartisan policy institute” whose aim is to increase
international collaboration on counterterrorism.139 The CGCC works
alongside the UN and regional groups, as well as national governments
and policymakers.140 The CGCC released a report in June 2013 entitled
“To Protect and Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter
Terrorist Abuse of the Nonprofit Sector.”141 The findings and
recommendations were the result of collaboration among several
international organizations, including the FATF (of which the U.S. is
a member, as discussed more fully below), who participated in a
multiyear UN project centered around ensuring charities are not
misused to fund terrorist activities.142 The project consisted of two
global-level meetings and five regional meetings, and participants in
the project included over fifty countries, eighty charities, members
from the UN and multilateral agencies, and representatives from the
FATF, FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs), and the financial
sector.143 Their findings and recommendations were compiled into the
above-mentioned report.144 Notably, the governments of several
countries were given special recognition for their contribution to the
endeavor, including the governments of Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.145 These countries’
involvement should lend additional credence to the ability of their

138. Most of the international supervisory organizations use the term non-profit organization (NPO);
however, the term charity is used throughout this article for consistency.
139. About, CENTER ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION, https://web.archive.org/web/
20130620021703/http://www.globalct.org/about (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (accessed by searching for
globalct.org/about in the Internet Archive index).
140. Id.
141. CENTER ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION, TO PROTECT AND PREVENT:
OUTCOMES OF A GLOBAL DIALOGUE TO COUNTER TERRORIST ABUSE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, (2013)
[hereinafter TO PROTECT AND PREVENT].
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 2.
145. See id. at 4.
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governments to prevent the diversion of charitable funds to
terrorism.146
Two of the recommendations of the report are significant in
considering the advantages associated with U.S. implementation of a
more flexible rule. The report found there is a definite need for greater
capacity building within States and for “a global network of regulators
and oversight bodies.”147 In terms of the former, better management of
information concerning charities through mechanisms, such as registry
databases, is necessary.148 Regarding the latter, the CGCC report found
that cooperation among national agencies is lacking.149 A network of
regulators that shares information on procedures and other expertise is
needed, and could be used to avoid the divergence of charitable funds
to terrorist activity.150 Additionally, it puts forth the idea of a website
whereby various countries could share relevant information.151 If the
U.S. implemented a system where it worked collaboratively with
another country, such as the U.K., in the endeavor to monitor charities,
both of these objectives would be met, and it would set a standard for
the rest of the world in terms of collaboration in the area. However, the
FATF will serve a crucial role in any system of international
monitoring.
2. The Most Relevant International Supervisory Organization—
the FATF
Perhaps the most relevant supervisory organization in the
international arena is the FATF. The FATF is an inter-governmental
unit that drafts and disseminates policies aimed at safeguarding the
“global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing
and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”152
146. For purposes of this paper, a basic premise is that the U.S. would engage in reciprocity with certain
EU Member States first, notably the U.K.; this premise is discussed infra p. 40.
147. TO PROTECT AND PREVENT, supra note 141, at vi.
148. Id.
149. Id at 13–14.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 14.
152. FATF, BEST PRACTICES: COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS
(RECOMMENDATION 8) (June 2013) [hereinafter FATF BEST PRACTICES], available at http://www.fatf-
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FATF policies are known as Recommendations, and they are separated
according to the measures to which they pertain: anti-money
laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT).153 The FATF
was founded in July 1989 as a result of the Group of Seven (G-7)
Summit in Paris, which was focused on the prevention of money
laundering.154 In October 2001, the FATF’s objective was expanded to
include the prevention of terrorist financing.155 Notably, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) also conducts assessments based
upon the FATF Recommendations.156
An examination of the responsibilities and membership
requirements of the FATF brings its crucial role into sharper focus.
The primary responsibilities of the FATF are to monitor the
implementation strategies of members, provide oversight of money
laundering and terrorist financing regulations, and to encourage the
enactment and implementation of similar measures in the international
arena.157 Through working with other international stakeholders, the
FATF works to cure “national-level vulnerabilities.”158
The FATF currently has thirty-six members, including the U.S.159
In addition, the European Commission is a member of the FATF and
each of the EU Member States are also separate members.160 In order
to qualify for membership, a country must agree in writing to uphold
the FATF’s Forty Recommendations and its Nine Special
Recommendations (collectively the FATF Recommendations) as well
as the FATF AML/CFT Methodology 2004 (as amended).161 Each
country also must agree to implement all FATF Recommendations
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Combating_the_abuse_of_NPOs_Rec8.pdf.
153. See id.
154. FATF, supra note 110.
155. See FATF, FATF IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2001), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf.
156. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 8.
157. See generally id. (proposing global recommendations to stop terrorists from obtaining funding).
158. See FATF, supra note 110.
159. Members and Observers, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/
(last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
160. See id.
161. Members and Observers, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/
membershipprocessandcriteria.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
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within a reasonable timeframe and to undergo a Mutual Evaluation
during the process (based on AML/CFT criteria), and periodically after
becoming a member.162 The FATF then releases a Mutual Evaluation
Report (MER), which details the member’s degree of compliance with
the FATF’s Recommendations.163 The current ratings are as follows:
Compliant, Largely Compliant, Partially Compliant, and NonCompliant.164 For purposes of this analysis, a country’s rating under
Special Recommendation VIII, now Recommendation 8 (R.8)165 is the
most relevant. The U.S. received a top rating of Compliant in its 2006
MER166 whereas the U.K. received the rating just below of Largely
Compliant.167 Later, I will address the rating of the U.S. in comparison
to that of Canada and Mexico,168 both of whom the U.S. has reciprocity
with in terms of charitable tax deductions under the terms of a bilateral
treaty.169 In essence, the FATF serves as an effective arbiter of how
well a country is monitoring the use of charitable funds to ensure they
do not end up in the hands of terrorists.
a. FATF Rules to Prevent Terrorist Financing Through
Charities: Recommendation 8
The FATF rules designed to prevent terrorist financing through
charities are based on R.8, which is one of the FATF’s Forty-Nine
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, SUMMARY OF THE THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 12 (2006) [hereinafter THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY], available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20ES.pdf.
164. See id.
165. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 3 n.3; George W. Sutton, The New FATF Standards, 4
GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. LAW 68, 87 (2012).
166. THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY, supra note 163, at 16.
167. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 288 (2007) [hereinafter THIRD U.K. MER], available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20UK%20FULL.pdf.
168. See infra Part III.E.
169. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Mex., art. 22(2), Sept. 18, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7 [hereinafter
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation]; see also Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital, U.S.-Can., art. XXI(5), Sept. 26, 1980, 1469 U.N.T.S. 189. The U.S. has a similar
agreement with Israel. Pozen, supra note 112, at 540.
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Recommendations.170 In fact, the FATF has noted that it drafted R.8
because countries vary widely in their governmental measures
designed to monitor the use of charitable funds, e.g., registration
requirements, reporting, and recordkeeping.171 Terrorist organizations
have used this lack of structure to infiltrate charitable organizations
and to divert funds.172 R.8 is an attempt to regulate these procedures
around the world. R.8 provides that countries should conduct a review
of the “adequacy of laws and regulations” to ensure charities cannot
be “misused by terrorist organizations: (i) to pose as legitimate entities;
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing,
including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; or (iii)
to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for
legitimate purposes, but diverted for terrorist purposes.”173
b. FATF Requirements: FATF Best Practices Paper and the
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8
The actions required to comply with R.8 are outlined in the FATF’s
Best Practices paper on R.8 (the FATF Best Practices Paper);174 in
addition, the FATF has released an Interpretive Note to clarify the
Recommendations (Interpretive Note to R.8).175 The FATF’s
Interpretive Note to R.8 goes on to identify specific measures for
meeting its objectives.176 Thus, the FATF Best Practices Paper and the
Interpretive Note to R.8 (together, the FATF Requirements), combined
with the use of existing terrorist lists, should satisfy the U.S. On a most
basic level, the Interpretive Note to R.8 instructs countries to conduct
a review of their charitable sector or to ensure there is another way to
obtain information on the sector’s “activities, size and other relevant
features.”177 It also advises countries to use such information to

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 7.
Id. at 54; see FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 3–4, 5.
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 54.
See id. at 13, 54.
Id.
See id. at 8, 54–58 (the Interpretive Note to R.8 is incorporated in the FATF Recommendations).
Id. at 54–58
Id. at 55.
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determine which charities are particularly vulnerable to terrorist abuse
and to conduct regular re-assessments.178
The Interpretive Note section entitled “Measures” goes on to
elaborate upon four specific actions countries should take in light of
four areas that form an effective approach to recognizing and avoiding
terrorist abuse of charities: “(a) outreach to the sector, (b) supervision
or monitoring, (c) effective investigation and information gathering
and (d) effective mechanisms for international cooperation.”179 In
comparing the actions associated with each of these four elements,
there are numerous similarities with the Treasury Department’s
Revised Guidelines that confront anti-terrorist financing, as discussed
later.180 Again, these similarities lend credence to the argument that
the U.S. should consider accepting the FATF’s rating of a country and
its sector as valid and reliable. Perhaps of even greater significance are
the actions associated with the fourth element dealing with
international co-operation. Members of the FATF agree to maintain
contact lists and procedures to assist with any other countries’ inquiries
regarding suspect charities.181 In light of the FATF’s role and diligence
in ensuring effective monitoring, the U.S. should be able to relinquish
at least part of its monitoring tasks.
C. Fitting It All Together for Implementation in the U.S.
For purposes of this article, a basic premise is that the U.S. would
recognize charities formed within certain EU Member States as
eligible to receive U.S. tax deductible donations. The standardized
charitable form proposed in the EU reflects a legal form that is easily
amenable to current U.S. requirements as explained in Part II. The next
section will show that the FATF requirements, subject to slight
modification, and FATF ratings of countries provide a way for the U.S.
to determine which EU countries have evinced acceptable precautions
for ensuring funds do not end up as terrorist financing. Presumably,
178.
179.
180.
181.
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the U.S. could begin with the U.K., given its pursuit of change, the
current regulatory measures in place, and the FATF assessment of its
compliance.182
The actual mechanism to be used should likely be an IRS-approved
list, as suggested in the first article of this series,183 although alternative
approaches are feasible.184 If the U.S. consulted the registry the U.K.
Charity Commission maintains and updated its own registry i.e.,
Exempt Organizations (EO) Select Check,185 in light of an approval
process, there would be an extra layer of supervision that would occur.
This would encourage other nations to maintain registries with the
hopes that other countries would reach similar agreements with them
and make the charitable sector vastly more transparent. Perhaps over
time, the U.S. and the U.K. would form a website where charities listed
on both registries (assuming reciprocity were to occur) could be
compiled, and information regarding such charities could be subjected
to even greater scrutiny by donors, thereby promoting efficiency.186
One point of contention relevant in terms of establishing an efficient
charitable market is that charities are having to divert too much of their
investments to complying with anti-terrorist measures; by deferring to
the international bodies and other regulatory authorities of certain
carefully chosen countries, the U.S. could reduce some of this cost and
thereby contribute to greater efficiency overall.187 In looking at not
only the U.S.’s approach but also that of other countries in preventing
the use of charitable organizations for terrorist financing, one must
consider the extent to which greater regulation stifles the ability of
charities to conduct their given purposes. A working group established
to discuss revisions to the initial Treasury Department Guidelines and
comprised of approximately thirty organizations, including private
foundations, public charities, and religious organizations, and which
182. See infra Part III.F.
183. Johnson, supra note 2, at 85–86.
184. See Zolt, supra note 17, at 393–94.
185. EO Select Check, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Exempt-OrganizationsSelect-Check (last updated Oct. 6, 2014).
186. See, infra Part III, for an exploration of the use of donor-advised funds. See also Johnson, supra
note 2, at 85–86 (explaining donor-advised funds).
187. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 84–85.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/2

30

: The Charitable Deduction Games: Catching Change

2015]

THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION GAMES

319

represented thousands of organizations (the Working Group)188 has
noted that the cost of complying should be considered.189 In addition,
Professor Mark Sidel cautions against the negative impact such
regulations may have and also suggests they might not be entirely
necessary: “We must be vigilant in observing and ensuring that these
new forms of regulation do not narrow the freedom of association and
voluntary sector activities that are so important in some [sic] many
countries around the world.’’190 A 2010 World Bank report also
revealed the rarity of charitable funds being diverted to terrorist
activity. 191 This point reinforces the conclusion that the U.S. should
consider deferring to the counter-terrorist regimes of other countries in
the regulation of charitable organizations. The FATF recently revised
its Recommendations with the aim of not placing stumbling blocks in
the paths of charities carrying on legitimate activities.192 In the next
section, I will consider other reasons why, with certain modifications,
the FATF approach, like the Working Group’s approach, is a wellsuited substitute to relying on the Revised Guidelines.
D. Comprehensive Analysis of Rules to Prevent Terrorist Financing
Through Charities: U.S. Treasury Regulations (Revised Guidelines)
v. FATF Requirements
If one considers why the Treasury Guidelines were revised, then it
becomes clear that the FATF requirements, subject to slight
modification, should be acceptable to the U.S. One should note that,
unlike the FATF requirements, the Revised Guidelines are not
compulsory.193 In this section, I will explain why the Treasury
Guidelines were revised to argue for U.S. acceptance of slightly
188. See id. at 84.
189. See id.; see also Sharon P. Light, The Principles of International Charity: An Effective Alternative
to the Voluntary Guidelines, INT’L DATELINE (Council on Founds., Arlington, Va.) First Quarter 2005, at
3.
190. MARK SIDEL, REGULATION OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR: FREEDOM AND SECURITY IN AN ERA OF
UNCERTAINTY 134 (2010).
191. EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE COMBATTING OF
TERRORISM FINANCING: A PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE 5, 11–13, 19 (2010).
192. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 55.
193. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,838, 63,843 & n.1 (Oct. 31, 2006).
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modified FATF requirements as a suitable substitute. To build upon
that argument, I will set forth a comprehensive comparison of the
Revised Guidelines and the FATF requirements and show that they
are, in fact, similar. I will conclude that if a country subject to the
FATF requirements, with a satisfactory FATF rating, agrees to the use
of existing terrorist lists detailed in the Revised Guidelines, the U.S.
should recognize its charities as able to accept U.S. tax deductible
donations.
1. The Need for a Simple Approach
If one examines the report of the Working Group compiled in
response to the 2002 Revised Guidelines, “Principles of International
Charity” (the Principles), it is clear that a simple approach is what the
charitable sector feels is the most appropriate response to terrorist
concerns.194 The FATF’s approach, detailed more fully later,195
embodies the main tenets of the Principles and the desire to keep its
standards simple for members. As a result, the FATF requirements,
subject to the modification explained below, should satisfy the U.S.
The 2002 Guidelines were revised due in part because they were
largely viewed as untenable.196 In revising the Guidelines, the Treasury
Department considered the Principles, which reflected the Working
Group’s position as representatives of the charitable sector.197 Chief
among the Working Group’s concerns was simplicity.198 The
following four tenets were deemed the most important in preventing
terrorist abuse of U.S. charities in the Principles: (1) charitable
organizations must only carry out the charitable purposes for which
they were formed, (2) charitable organizations must meet the
charitable law standards of the U.S. and the relevant laws of foreign
194. TREASURY GUIDELINES WORKING GROUP, COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (2005); see Sharon P. Light, The Principles of International Charity: An
Effective Alternative to the Voluntary Guidelines, INT’L DATELINE (Council on Founds., Arlington, Va.)
First Quarter 2005, at 3. One reason for adopting a simple approach is to avoid the overuse of charitable
funds for compliance. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 54–55.
195. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 54–58.
196. Johnson, supra note 2, at 84.
197. Id.; see Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,838, 63,840 (Oct. 31, 2006).
198. See Light, supra note 189, at 3.
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jurisdictions in which they are carrying out their charitable purposes,
(3) a charitable organization’s compliance with relevant laws is the
province of the board of directors, and (4) charitable organizations
must ensure that appropriate steps are taken to ensure that their assets
are used only for charitable purposes through the use of financial
controls. 199
This straightforward approach provides charities with concrete
direction without overburdening them. In their 2006 Revised
Guidelines, the Treasury Department agreed with this approach with
one caveat: Use of existing “lists of suspected or known supporters of
terrorism” should be advocated.200
Similar to the Working Group’s report, the FATF requirements
(embodied in the Interpretive Note to R.8 and the FATF Best Practices
Paper regarding R.8) utilize a simplified approach. In fact, in its
Revised Guidelines, the Treasury Department recognized an FATF
Best Practices Paper as providing guidance on the prevention of abuse
of charities by terrorist organizations.201 Thus, if the FATF
requirements are modified to include the use of existing terrorist lists,
an area the Treasury Department found deficient in terms of the
Principles,202 they look remarkably similar to the 2006 Revised
Guidelines. As a result, the U.S. should view the FATF requirements
as an acceptable substitute. An understanding of the basic purpose and
principles of the non-compulsory, revised Treasury Guidelines also
lends support to this position.
2. U.S. Treasury Guidelines: Basic Purpose and Principles
The Revised Guidelines provide non-compulsory safeguards for the
prevention of terrorist financing,203 and the U.S. could make these
guidelines compulsory for any non-U.S. charity eligible to collect U.S.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 5; Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63, 842, 63, 847.
201. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,848.
202. See id. at 63,846 n.11, 63,840; Kay Guinane, Summary of 2005 Revisions to U.S. Department of
the Treasury’s Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Dec. 12, 2005),
http://dev.ombwatch.org/node/2712.
203. Id. at 63,843 n.1.
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funds as a way to safeguard against terrorist funding. However, this is
an unnecessary step. As the following survey will show, the FATF
requirements already reflect much of what is advised.204 Interestingly,
the Treasury Department notes that its Revised Guidelines are not
intended to supersede or modify the practices of charities with
extensive experience in providing international aid and notes that
many already have implemented “effective internal controls and
practices that lessen the risk of terrorist financing or abuse.”205 Also,
the Treasury Department acknowledges that emergency situations,
specifically catastrophic disasters,206 may mean the Revised
Guidelines are more difficult to apply in practice; this reality should
influence which charities are placed on an IRS-approved list.207 One
purpose of the Revised Guidelines is to increase awareness among
donors and U.S. charities of the practices charities may put in place to
decrease the risk that funds end up financing terrorist activity.208
Another stated purpose of the Revised Guidelines is to assist charities
with understanding U.S. legal requirements in place to prevent terrorist
financing, including sanctions programs associated with the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).209
There are four fundamental principles of good practice set forth in
the Revised Guidelines:
(1) Charities are required to comply with all laws of the U.S.
Government, including OFAC-administered sanctions
programs.210

204. See infra Part III.D.3.
205. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,843.
206. Id.
207. See generally Eric Friedman, Putting Your Charity Dollars Where They Matter Most, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2014, at 19.
208. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,843.
209. Id.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (prohibiting “material support or resources”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339C (2012) (prohibiting financing); see also Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at
63,843 n.2 (detailing complete list of the federal criminal statutes pertaining to terrorist funding).
210. See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,843& n.2 (“OFAC sanctions programs
include those relating to particular countries or regimes (country-based programs), as well as those relating
to groups, individuals, or entities engaged in specific activities . . . .”). Presumably, this standard would
apply according to the home State law of the charity. Note that sanctions programs either forbid certain
transactions, impose a U.S. block on assets and property, or both. Id.
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(2) Charities should adopt practices outside of the law to
ensure assets are used only for charitable purposes or
other legitimate purposes.211
(3) Those individuals carrying out fiduciary responsibilities
on behalf of the charity should evince due care. The
Guidelines provide that such care should be exercised as
defined under “applicable common law as well as local,
state, and federal” law.212
(4) Every level of the charity and its operations must reflect
“[g]overnance, fiscal and programmatic responsibility[,]
and accountability . . . .”213
These principles inform the more detailed instructions of the Revised
Guidelines. As apparent from the section below, the FATF
requirements evince a similar approach.214 Following is a first
comprehensive comparison of the Revised Guidelines and the FATF
requirements. It starts with the fourth factor above, accountability and
transparency, and next turns to two other topics: programmatic
verification, i.e., preventing improper use of funds, and the
responsibilities of the governing board. Finally, the comparison
examines the Revised Guidelines’ anti-terrorist financing provisions,
i.e., verification of grantees and employees, and the Interpretive Note
to R.8, which is the overarching document informing the FATF Best
Practices Paper.215
3. Comparison of U.S. Treasury Guidelines with FATF
Requirements
Because FATF members must commit to implementing the FATF’s
requirements and to undergoing regular assessments of their
compliance,216 the U.S. can rely on the FATF’s monitoring.
211. Id. at 63,844.
212. Id. Presumably, this standard would apply according to the home State law of the charity.
213. Id.
214. See infra Part III.D.3.
215. See generally FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152 (referring, throughout, to the FATF
Recommendations Interpretive Note to R.8).
216. Id. at 6; FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 54.
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Nevertheless, the U.S. should require use of existing terrorist lists in
the way the Revised Guidelines advocate. In this section, I will set
forth a comprehensive survey of the Revised Guidelines and the
provisions of the FATF’s requirements and conclude that they
surprisingly encompass similar goals and methods. As a result, the
FATF’s requirements, if modified to include use of existing terrorist
lists, and the FATF’s ongoing assessment process provide adequate
oversight.
a. Financial Accountability and Transparency
The methods presented in the FATF Best Practices Paper under
“Financial Transparency” and the Revised Guidelines under
“Financial Accountability and Transparency” mirror each other.217
This lends credence to an argument that the U.S. may rely on FATF
standards upheld in the FATF Best Practices Paper. The FATF Best
Practices Paper emphasizes the use of full program budgets that detail
expenses of the charity and include the identity of recipients as well as
an explanation of how funds have been used; it also stresses the
importance of independent auditing in order to retain donor
confidence.218 The Revised Guidelines provide for a near identical
requirement, except that a threshold for the audit is included.219
Specifically, the Revised Guidelines instruct charities to have in the
place the following: an annual budget that the governing board has
adopted, approved, and supervised; a board-appointed financial
auditor responsible for daily control over the charity’s assets; and for
those charities whose annual gross income exceeds $250,000, an
annual publicly available audit from a board-selected independent
certified public accounting firm.220 While the Revised Guidelines
provide a slightly higher level of detail, overall the general admonition
to charities is the same.

217. Compare FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, with Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71
Fed. Reg. at 63,844.
218. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7.
219. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,841.
220. Id. at 63,844–45.
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b. Receipt and Disbursement of Funds
The FATF Best Practices Paper includes a subsection on bank
accounts under the “Financial Transparency” section,221 and the
Revised Guidelines address this issue under a subsection entitled
“Receipt and Disbursement of Funds.”222 Although the requirement
under the FATF Best Practices Paper is much terser, essentially, the
Revised Guidelines add only two other requirements: (1) compliance
with generally accepted accounting principles and Code requirements
and (2) maintenance of a record of salaries.223 Both the FATF and the
Treasury Department urge charities to make disbursements through
check or wire transfers rather than cash or currency disbursements.224
Finally, the Revised Guidelines include parameters for the solicitation
for funds under this section,225 whereas the FATF Best Practices Paper
addresses this issue under a separate “Solicitation” section.226 Most
notably, the Revised Guidelines provide that the charity should state
its intended goals and purposes for soliciting funds to foster an
independent conclusion about whether the charity is complying with
its goals.227 In addition, the Revised Guidelines note that solicitations
should accurately inform donors of how their donations will be
spent.228 If a charity decides to expend funds for another purpose, it
should immediately and publicly disclose that fact.229 Similarly, the
FATF Best Practices Paper states that charities should identify the
purposes for which they are soliciting funds and ensure that such funds
are used for stated purposes.230
The main difference between the two involves public disclosure.
The Revised Guidelines are much more insistent upon revealing
221. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7.
222. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
223. Id.
224. Compare id., with FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7 (stating that formal financial
systems should be used for transactions and encouraging the bringing of charitable accounts within the
formal banking system).
225. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
226. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7.
227. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
228. Id. (defining final solicitation requirement regarding substantiation of donations).
229. Id.
230. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7.
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information to the public,231 and the U.S. should require this of nonU.S. charities.232 Also, the FATF does make its reports of compliance
public.233 The Revised Guidelines consider various mechanisms for
public disclosure. Clearly, one of the most crucial mechanisms is the
annual report requirement. Charities are urged to file an annual report
that is available to the public.234 The suggested form for the annual
report is similar to the Form 990 and Form 990-PF that U.S. charities
are already required to file.235 The Revised Guidelines also advocate
permitting any member of the public to see the charity’s financial
statements, including its financial audit upon request.236 The FATF
Best Practices Paper appears to support this action as well.237
c. Programmatic Verification
Programmatic Verification is a major category for both the FATF
and the Revised Guidelines. Both use this section to reflect a concern
for ensuring proper use of and preventing diversion of funds.238 Under
this heading, the Revised Guidelines contain sub-headings on
“Supplying Resources,” “Supplying Services,” and “Programmatic
Review.”239 Under “Supplying Resources,” the Revised Guidelines
state charities should ensure grantees have the ability to complete the
goal for which the money was given and to safeguard against the
resources ending up in the hands of terrorists.240 Secondly, they note a

231. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
232. At the same time, one may argue that in an efficient charitable market only providers of sufficient
information will continue to be funded. See discussion supra pp. 3–4.
233. See, e.g., THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY, supra note 163.
234. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
235. Id. (noting that the report should contain a statement of the “charity’s purpose(s), programs,
activities, tax exempt status, the structure and responsibility of the governing board of the charity, and
financial information.”); see, e.g., I.R.S. Form 990 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990.pdf.
236. See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
237. See FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 6 (“Transparency is in the interest of the donors,
organisations, and authorities.”).
238. Id. at 7; Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
239. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. The rules regarding “Supplying
Resources” and “Programmatic Review” are very similar to the expenditure responsibility rules that
govern private foundation grants. See Dale, supra note 112, at 680–84.
240. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,842.
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written agreement should govern the terms of the grant.241 The
requirement of a written agreement between the grantee and the charity
is a notable distinction in the Revised Guidelines.242 Finally, the
Revised Guidelines urge the charity to exercise oversight over the use
of funds during the term of the grant and to terminate the relationship
should abuse occur.243
The FATF Best Practices Paper confronts the same issues through
asking charities to conduct an assessment using the following four
direct questions: “Have projects actually been carried out? Are the
beneficiaries real? Have the intended beneficiaries received the funds
that were sent for them? Are all funds, assets, and premises accounted
for?”244
These questions parallel the Revised Guidelines, which provide that
grantees should file periodic reports on their operations and disbursed
funds, and grantees should take reasonable steps to ensure funds are
not diverted to terrorist activity (of which the charities should be
advised).245 The Revised Guidelines indicate charities should carry out
“routine, on-site audits of grantees to the extent reasonable.”246 Again,
most of these precautions follow logically from the above-mentioned
questions associated with the “Oversight” section of the FATF Best
Practices Paper.247 The FATF Best Practices Paper recommends that
charities conduct direct field examinations as needed to ensure funds
are being expended for the agreed upon purposes.248
Inter-government collaboration is a hallmark of the FATF Best
Practices Paper that the U.S. should adopt. Notably different from the
Revised Guidelines, the FATF Best Practices Paper identifies the need
for cooperation between countries when the charity’s home office is in
a country different from where its charitable work is being performed,

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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Id. at 63,845.
See id.
Id. The Revised Guidelines also detail similar suggestions regarding “Supplying Services.” Id.
FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7–8.
Compare id., with Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845.
FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
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under the section, “Foreign Operations.”249 The U.S. should also
encourage collaboration in these instances, as well. Clearly, having
two countries monitor the effectiveness of charities is preferable from
many standpoints.
d. Responsibilities of the Board
Both the Revised Guidelines and the FATF Best Practices Paper
place primary responsibility with preventing terrorism financing, i.e.,
accountability and transparency, with the governing board.250
Accordingly, each sets forth board requirements,251 and a comparison
reveals they are remarkably similar. The Revised Guidelines clearly
state the functions and parameters of the board. The following is a
summary of the seven requirements:
(1) Board members should not be involved with the “day-today management” of the charity, and the charity should
have a conflict of interest policy in place for all board
members and employees. (The conflict of interest policy
should delineate procedures applicable if a board member
or employee has a conflict of interest or a perceived
conflict of interest in terms of managing or operating the
charity).252
(2) The board’s responsibilities are to ensure compliance with
relevant laws, to maintain the charity’s finances and
accounting practices through adopting, implementing, and
overseeing such practices, including financial
recordkeeping designed to safeguard assets.253

249. Id.
250. Compare id., with Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844.
251. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 8–9; Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 63,844. The Revised Guidelines go on to set forth principles for key employees, defined not only as the
most highly compensated employees but also as any employees involved in the disbursement of funds.
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844 n.7. The Revised Guidelines state charities
should maintain a list of their five most highly compensated employees, identifying information for any
key, non-U.S. employees working abroad, and identifying information, subject to privacy rights, for any
key employees of subsidiaries or affiliates. Id. at 63,844.
252. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844.
253. Id.
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(3) The board should keep records of its decisions.254
(4) A list of the names, salaries, and relevant affiliations of all
board members should be maintained and made available
to the public.255
(5) Within the confines of individual privacy rights, charities
should have records of certain additional information
about the board, including their home address, citizenship,
etc.256
(6) Subject to the same restriction as above, the charity should
have the aforementioned information for the boards of any
subsidiaries or affiliates receiving their charitable
funds.257
(7) In the event of being served with process or when there is
other “appropriate authorization,” the charity should
deliver records required under the Guidelines to
regulatory/supervisory and law enforcement authorities
without delay.258
Of these requirements, all are reflected in the FATF’s Best Practices
Paper, except for the first, conflict of interest policy, and the last two,
subsidiary level application and response to service of process.259 In
terms of modification of the FATF approach, the U.S. should view it
as crucial that a conflict of interest policy detailed in the first
requirement is in place.260 The sixth requirement adds another level of
scrutiny, which is only suggested in the FATF Best Practices Paper.261
Finally, requirement seven is also implied, but not expressly provided
for in the FATF Best Practices Paper.262 Even if a charity only
complied with the four requirements of the FATF Best Practices Paper,

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844.
FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 9.
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844.
FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 8.
Id. at 10.
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plus the conflict of interest policy, there should be sufficient
precautions in place to prevent the diversion of funds.
e. Anti-Terrorist Financing Best Practices
The last section of the Revised Guidelines, “Anti-Terrorist
Financing Best Practices,” in addition to the Interpretive Note to R.8
most closely resembles the course of action suggested. Under
“Measures,” the Interpretive Note to R.8 details actions FATF
countries should take to form an effective approach to recognizing and
avoiding terrorist abuse of charities: “(a) outreach to the sector, (b)
supervision or monitoring, (c) effective investigation and information
gathering and (d) effective mechanisms for international
cooperation.”263 The “supervision or monitoring” measure closely
shadows, albeit on a more macro level, Part VI of the Revised
Guidelines on anti-terrorist financing.264 This “supervision or
monitoring” measure provides:
[Charities] should follow a “know your beneficiaries and associate
[charities]” rule, which means that the [charity] should make best
efforts to confirm the identity, credentials and good standing of
their beneficiaries and associate [charities]. [Charities] should also
undertake best efforts to document the identity of their significant
donors and to respect donor confidentiality.265

In contrast, the Revised Guidelines detail steps a charity should
consider undertaking before deciding to make any grants.266
Importantly, the Revised Guidelines emphasize that all steps are not
necessary and advocate a risk-based approach, particularly in regard to
foreign grantees.267 According to the Revised Guidelines, charities
should consider collecting the following information about grantees:

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 55–56.
Compare id. at 56–57, with Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845–46.
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 57.
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845–46.
Id. at 63,845–46.
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(1) their name (which seems obvious), language spoken in
home country, and any acronym or other name the grantee
uses;
(2) the relevant jurisdictions where the charity has a physical
presence;
(3) historical information that would confirm the grantee’s
“identity and integrity” such as its place of incorporation;
its incorporation documents and governing instruments;
the name of the incorporator and the names of those who
operate it; and information about its operating history;
(4) identifying information about the place(s) of business of
the charity;
(5) a statement of the general purpose of the charity;
(6) identifying information for the “individuals, entities, and
organizations to which the grantee currently provides or
proposes to provide funding, services, or material support,
to the extent reasonably discoverable;”
(7) identifying information for subcontracting organizations
the grantee uses;
(8) any “public filings or releases,” including any annual
reports, essentially those equivalent to the Form 990 or
Form 990-PF; and
(9) a list of additional sources of income as well as
commercial activities.268
In sum, the Revised Guidelines set forth an overview of the basic
steps a charity should take to prevent terrorist financing. Additionally,
the Revised Guidelines offer a procedure for “vetting” grantees.269 The
Revised Guidelines separate this process into vetting of grantees and
vetting of the charities’ key employees.270 The main recommendation
is to “conduct a reasonable search of publicly available information”
to determine whether there has been any question of a grantee
engaging in terrorist activity, including terrorist financing.271
268.
269.
270.
271.
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Accordingly, the Revised Guidelines state plainly that charities should
avoid conducting transactions with a grantee where such “terroristrelated suspicions exist.”272 The Revised Guidelines do not seem to
add requirements to the Interpretive Note to R.8, but rather merely
expand upon specific steps that may be taken to “know your [grantees]
and associate [charities].”273
Both the FATF Best Practices Paper and the Revised Guidelines
encourage charities to utilize not only tax authorities but also other law
enforcement authorities and regulatory authorities in preventing
terrorist financing.274 The FATF Best Practices Paper advocates
drawing upon the expertise of the financial sector in investigating
possible terrorist connections.275 Information sharing among such
bodies is encouraged in both as well.276 The FATF Best Practices
Paper also states that private watchdog organizations may prove
beneficial,277 which is a resource that should play a larger role in the
U.S. monitoring and perceived monitoring assessment of other
countries. 278
In contrast to the FATF requirements, the Revised Guidelines
identify specific U.S. lists that should be used to gather information
about grantees.279 The U.S. should require any non-U.S. charity to
attest to verifying grantees against these lists, as well, especially where
other UN Member States are involved. First, in terms of the lists that
should be used in conducting the search, the Revised Guidelines
recommend the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).280 The TEL is a result
272. Id. at 63,847.
273. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 57.
274. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844; FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note
152, at 9, 10. These concerns are also described in the Interpretive Note to R.8 under the measure on
effective information gathering and investigation. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 57–58.
275. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 10–11.
276. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 57; see Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines,
71 Fed. Reg. at 63,847.
277. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 11.
278. Current private sector monitors of U.S. charities include Guidestar, Council on Foundations, and
The National Council on Charitable Statistics. See About, NCCS, nccs.urban.org/about/index.cfm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2014). Cf. Gallagher, supra note 104 (recommending Guidestar’s donor list as a method
to validate grantees).
279. Compare Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,846, with FATF BEST
PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 11.
280. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,846 n.11.
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of the Patriot Act and permits the Secretary of State to include groups
after consulting with or at the request of the Attorney General.281 The
notes to the Revised Guidelines explain that there is an overlap
between the list of Specially Designated Nationals that OFAC
maintains (the SDN List) and the TEL, but in comparison, the SDN
list is under inclusive.282 Second, even though the SDN list is under
inclusive, the Revised Guidelines advise charities to check that a given
grantee is not on the OFAC SDN list and has not been sanctioned by
OFAC.283 Since the SDN List is available in different formats,
charities will be able to search grantees easily according to “program,
by country of residency, individuals vs. entities,” etc. in conducting
risk-based research.284 Third, charities are urged to ensure that key
employees, board members, and “other senior management at a
grantee’s principal place of business, and for key employees at . . .
other business locations” 285 are fully identified and that such
individuals are not subject to OFAC sanctions.286 Fourth, charities
should consult other countries’ equivalent of these lists of “designated
terrorist-related individuals, entities, or organizations” that are
maintained in compliance with the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001) (UNSCR 1373).287 UNSCR 1373 was adopted
on September 28, 2001 and directs UN Member States to implement
measures to prevent terrorism.288 Most relevantly, the UN Member

281. Id.
282. Id. The notes specify that U.S. persons may not provide services or conduct transactions with
individuals designated on this list and stating that a block has been entered on their assets. Id. at 63,846
n.12.
283. Id. at 63,846 & n.11.
284. See id. at 63,846 n.12.
285. Id. at 63,846.
286. See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,846–47 (stating that full identification
means their full name in English, native language, any acronym or aliases used, nationality, citizenship,
residence country, and birth date and location).
287. Id. at 63,847. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (UNSCR
1373), UN Member States must freeze the funds and assets of any persons providing financial assistance
or other support to “terrorist activity or terrorist-related individuals, entities, or organizations” and stating
UN Member States must maintain a list of sanctioned parties. Id. at 63,847 n.14 (citing S.C. Res. 1373,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)).
288. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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States are called upon to criminalize acts of terrorism and to “work
together . . . to prevent and suppress terrorist acts.”289
The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)
monitors compliance with UNSCR 1373290 and UNSCR 1624 (2005),
a second resolution designed to criminalize the incitement of acts of
terrorism.291 As part of its efforts, the CTC requested that each country
submit a report on the measures it has taken to prevent terrorism.292
Experts have commented that the CTC maintains “the world’s largest
body of information on the counter-terrorism capacity of each of the
192 UN Member States.”293 Interestingly, one of the reasons the
Revised Guidelines encourage charities operating abroad to consider
using the foreign UNSCR 1373 lists as part of “additional
precautionary measures” is because doing so could help prevent the
charity from being subject to sanctions or other penalties for failing to
comply with foreign law.294 Additionally, the Revised Guidelines
recommend checking the board and key employees of foreign grantees
against this list as an additional safeguard measure.295 Foreign
countries part of the UN will seek to impose sanctions on any
individual, entity, or organization participating in terrorist support or
financing.296
Additionally, with regard to the grantee and its individual members
(i.e., key employees, board members, and other senior management),
charities should consult “publicly available information” to determine
whether they are “reasonably suspected” of terrorist activity, including
funding.297 Finally, a pre-requisite for any grantee receiving funding
from a charity should be a signed certification that it has complied with
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).
292. See id.¶ 5.
293. Country
Reports,
SECURITY
COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM
COMMITTEE,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/countryreports.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2012); see DAVID
CORTRIGHT, A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE UN COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES 5 & n.12 (2005) (describing the number of reports submitted by
member states and their effect on the CTC’s knowledge of counter-terrorism efforts).
294. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,847 n.14.
295. Id. at 63,847.
296. See id.
297. Id.
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all U.S. laws that prohibit U.S. persons from conducting affairs with
any individual, entities, or organizations upon which OFAC sanctions
have been imposed or with foreign grantees, that they do not conduct
transactions with known terrorist supporters or violators of OFAC
sanctions.298
In terms of vetting its own key employees, charities are advised to
take similar steps.299 Again, a “reasonable search of publicly available
information” for key employees and potential employees should be
conducted to ensure a lack of participation with terrorist activity or
support.300 Likewise, the charity should ensure that its key employees
have not been assessed or have infringed OFAC sanctions.301 The
Revised Guidelines detail the proper responses in the event the charity
finds any of its own key employees, board members, senior
management, or those of its grantees or the grantees themselves have
a questionable tie to terrorist activity, including funding or support.302
If the charity finds any of the above mentioned parties on the SDN
List, it should exercise due diligence in accordance with the procedures
set forth on the OFAC website.303 If the charity does not find a
connection on the SDN List but finds questionable terrorist activity, it
should report this information through a referral form that is accessible
on the Treasury Department’s website.304 Also, this information may
be reported to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) local field
offices.305 Accordingly, the U.S. should require any eligible non-U.S.
charity to report such findings not only to the FBI but also to its
governmental authorities.306 The point is not only to prevent diversion
of funds but also to ensure reporting to relevant authorities.

298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,847.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Cf. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 5, 9–10 (encouraging transparency and cooperation
between charities and their appropriate governing bodies, as well as accountability of charities to the
appropriate authorities).
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In comparing the methods of the FATF requirements with the
Revised Guidelines, there are numerous similarities. These
commonalities lend credence to the argument that the U.S. should
accept the FATF’s rating of a country’s charitable oversight under R.8
as valid and reliable. Perhaps of even greater significance are the
actions associated with the fourth element, i.e., international cooperation. In light of the FATF’s role and diligence in ensuring
effective monitoring, the U.S. should be able to relinquish at least part
of its monitoring tasks, subject to certain modifications, particularly
the use of lists in vetting grantees.
E. Current Inconsistent U.S. Stance
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current regulation is that
the U.S. allows donors to make tax deductible contributions to
charities in other countries through bilateral treaty provisions, despite
their low FATF ratings.307 This section will involve an examination of
two of the three countries the U.S. has entered into bilateral treaties
with that allow U.S. deductions for contributions to their charities.
Under Article XXI(5) of the U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty, a U.S.
citizen or resident may receive a U.S. tax deduction for a donation to
certain Canadian charities that are (1) treated essentially as a charity in
Canada and (2) would be treated as a charity if formed in the U.S. 308
A similar provision applies under Article 22(2) of the U.S.-Mexico
Income Tax Treaty.309 Both Canada and Mexico have received
unsatisfactory MERs in regard to R.8.310 They are falling short of other
countries, such as the U.K., in terms of anti-terrorist financing
prevention.311 The U.S. should allow charities formed in other
307. See supra Part III.B.2.
308. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, supra note 169.
309. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 169.
310. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
AND COMBATTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM-CANADA 254–59, 300 (2008) [hereinafter THIRD
CANADA MER], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20
Canada%20full.pdf; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, MUTUAL EVALUATION ON ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM-MEXICO 261–62, 324 (2008)
[hereinafter MEXICO MER], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/
MER%20Mexico%20ful.pdf.
311. Compare THIRD CANADA MER, supra note 310, at 300, and MEXICO MER, supra note 310, at
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countries (that have more favorable FATF ratings) to enjoy the same
treatment as these less FATF compliant countries. The U.S. should
adopt a more logical standpoint and rely on FATF assessments in
allowing U.S. donors more flexibility in investing abroad.
1. FATF Rating of Canada
As mentioned above, under the terms of the U.S.-Canada Treaty, a
U.S. donor may receive a tax deduction for a contribution to certain
Canadian charities.312 Nevertheless, in its 2008 MER, Canada was
found to be only Largely Compliant with Recommendation 8
(formerly SR.VIII).313 The report noted this rating was based on
Canada’s failure to put in place “co-ordination mechanisms between
competent authorities, especially between the [Canada Revenue
Agency] and the parties responsible for listing and freezing
applications.”314 This failure and its effect on this ranking meant that
Canada was not taking sufficient precautions against the risk of
terrorist financing through its nonprofit sector.315 Even after six
follow-up MERs, it does not appear that Canada has revised its laws
in a manner that takes account of this concern.316
2. FATF Rating of Mexico
Similarly, Mexico’s 2008 MER stated it had failed to meet the basic
requirement of R.8 (formerly SR. VIII): to conduct a review of its laws
and regulations governing nonprofit organizations to determine their
adequacy in respect to preventing terrorist financing.317 Moreover, it
did not have mechanisms in place to obtain information regarding its
nonprofit sector or their “activities, size[,] and other relevant features”
324, with THIRD U.K. MER, supra note 167, at 288. Although the U.K. was given the same ranking as
Canada, the U.K. was deficient only within Northern Ireland, as explained infra Part III.F.
312. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, supra note 169.
313. THIRD CANADA MER, supra note 310, at 259, 300.
314. Id. at 259.
315. See id.
316. See FATF, SIXTH FOLLOW-UP REPORT MUTUAL EVALUATION OF CANADA (2014) (commenting
on Canada’s updated laws to achieve compliance without mention of R.8), available at www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/met/FUR-Canada-2014.pdf.
317. See THIRD MEXICO MER, supra note 310, at 256, 261–62.
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to better understand which organizations were likely to be at risk for a
misdirection of funds to terrorist activity.318 Overall, Mexico received
a rating of Partially Compliant, which is lower than the ratings of both
the U.S. and Canada.319 The other deficiencies recorded in Mexico’s
report include the following: (1) the failure to raise awareness or to
suggest precautions to prevent charitable funds from being used as
terrorist financing, and (2) the failure to put in place investigative
measures to make a determination of charities which either are being
misused in or actively involved in terrorist financing.320
F. Going Forward—U.S. Approach
It would be an easy stretch for the U.S. to recognize U.K. charities,
and perhaps even those of other EU Member States, as having
comparable oversight to U.S. charities and therefore to allow U.S.
donors to receive deductions for contributions made to them. The
U.K.’s regulation of its sector in some ways vastly exceeds the
regulation present in the U.S. In its most recent MER, the U.K.
received, in terms of R.8 (formerly SR.VIII), the same rating of
Largely Compliant as Canada did, which is just one mark lower than
the U.S. received.321 However, unlike Canada’s rating, the U.K.’s
rating was based on the absence of a system for providing for
registration, transparency, and supervision of charities formed in a
certain part of it, namely Northern Ireland.322 In other words, the
charities associated with the rest of the U.K. were deemed to have met
the standards associated with R.8. If the U.S. chose to acknowledge
U.K. charities as valid vehicles for the contribution of U.S. charitable
funds, it could exclude charities in Northern Ireland until the issue is
remedied. To not allow deductible contributions to U.K. charities,
which are in form similar to, and at times more effective than, U.S.
charities leads to a more ineffective charitable market. Furthermore,
318. Id. at 256, 261.
319. Compare THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY, supra note 163, at 16, and THIRD CANADA MER, supra
note 310, at 259, 300, with MEXICO MER, supra note 310, at 262, 324.
320. MEXICO MER, supra note 310, at 261–62, 336–37.
321. THIRD U.K. MER, supra note 167, at 288; THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY, supra note 163, at 16.
322. THIRD U.K. MER, supra note 167, at 288.
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the IMF’s findings on countries’ compliance with FATF
Recommendations from 2004-2011, evinced that the U.K. ranked
higher (35.33) than the U.S. (34.33) in terms of overall compliance.323
Interestingly, even though Canada and the U.K. received a rating of
Largely Compliant on their respective MERs, Canada’s overall IMF
score (25) was significantly lower than the U.K.’s.324 Mexico’s overall
score (24.67) was even lower than Canada’s.325 A comprehensive
approach whereby the U.S. examines the rating of a country in terms
of R.8 and its overall IMF rating could be used to determine which
countries’ charities are eligible to receive U.S. tax deductible
contributions. Given the procedures that would need to be put in place
for such an agreement to be made, the U.S. may prefer only to extend
this treatment to EU Member States who have received a rating of at
least Largely Compliant in terms of R.8 and a minimum overall IMF
rating equal to at least that of the U.S., which currently is 34.33. An
examination of the rigorous approach associated with the FATF’s
rating system and the IMF’s findings lends credence to this thought.
CONCLUSION: THE PATHWAY TO CHANGE
To create an efficient charitable market, the U.S. must unshackle the
hands of the giver to enable greater ease in cross-border charitable
giving. As this article has shown, there are solutions to the problems
associated with changing the law in this regard. First, there is a way to
ensure that the floodgates are not opened too widely for U.S.
investment in non-U.S. charities. The U.S. should define the range of
acceptable charitable purposes based upon pressing, agreed-upon
goals that foster global good. The UN Millennium Development Goals
represent such aims.326 Moreover, as expert economists and advisers
have noted, funding for the UN MDGs has been deficient, and the U.S.
323. Concepcion Verdugo Yepes, Compliance with the AML/CFT Standard: Lessons from a CrossCountry Analysis 39 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/177, 2011). The U.S. was ranked as
such in 2005 and the U.K. was ranked in 2006; neither was ranked more recently for the purposes of this
evaluation. See id. at 39, 42.
324. See id. at 39.
325. See id.
326. See supra Part I.A.

Published by Reading Room, 2015

51

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 2

340

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

may assist with correcting it through declaring the UN MDGs
acceptable charitable purposes for eligible non-U.S. charities.327
Second, the U.S. must provide a standardized charitable form for such
non-U.S. charities, so they will have certainty in terms of receiving a
U.S. stamp of approval. A standardized charitable form will cut down
on inefficient spending to meet tax and administrative requirements
specific to the U.S.328 The EU standardized charitable form proposed
for EU Member States in 2012 (i.e., the FE Statute) is instructive and
may be modified to fit U.S. standards.329 Following this reasoning,
charities formed under the FE Statute, with the appropriate
modifications, should be acceptable to the U.S.330 Finally, the U.S.
may ensure that unshackled investment does not end up financing
terrorism. Contrary to conventional thinking, the IRS has done an
inadequate job of monitoring the financing activity of U.S. charities,331
and a U.S. decision to relinquish some of its monitoring (in the context
of non-U.S. charities) would lead to more collaborative oversight
throughout the global charitable sector. The FATF serves as a premier
global monitor of its member countries’ ability to prevent terrorist
financing.332 Accordingly, the U.S. may rely on its requirements,
subject to modifications, and its ratings of various countries’
compliance.
There is every reason to believe that a modified version of the
existing FATF requirements could be applied to non-U.S. charities
with satisfactory FATF ratings and proper form. These non-U.S.
charities then could be placed on an IRS foreign donor list entitling
donors to them to receive a U.S. tax deduction.333 The U.S. should start
with U.K. and other EU charities (formed under the terms of the FE
statute and with high FATF ratings) and require modification as
outlined.334 The U.S. has the opportunity to take a historic lead in
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See Johnson, supra note 2, at 85–86.
See supra Part III.C–D.
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establishing an efficient charitable market and in doing so help to
alleviate some of the most urgent global ills in the process. Once the
hands of givers are unshackled through a change in U.S. cross-border
giving law, the U.S. may direct, guide, and protect such investment to
ensure it ends up in the best place possible, in its most productive use
for humanity and the world.
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